In his The Uses of Argument (Cambridge University Press, 1958), S. Toulmin presents serious charges against ordinary logical theory, e.g., that it does not distinguish between analytic or formally valid or conclusive or warrant-using arguments, that the distinction between premises and conclusion is a bad oversimplification, that "major premise" conceals the distinction between inference-warrant and inference-backings, that logicians have been mistakenly working under an ideal of geometrical form. The paper argues that none of the charges is proven, that most of (...) them cannot be proven, that Toulmin's new logic is at best only vaguely hinted at and that his suggestions are positively obscure or mistaken. (shrink)

The ten essays making up Knowledge and Certainty appear in chronological order. With two exceptions, they fall naturally into three categories corresponding to three stages in the development of Malcolm's philosophical career: the first three essays are critical studies of other philosophers' views and contain interesting discussions of the ordinary meanings of some English expressions; the fourth, fifth, and eighth essays are, so to speak, Wittgensteinian studies; in them Malcolm is concerned with both interpreting Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and applying the (...) views he attributes to Wittgenstein to certain philosophical problems; the last two essays, written in 1961, are direct attempts at analyzing some concepts involving the idea of memory; in them Malcolm is not ostensibly working under Wittgensteinian views or prejudices, and his philosophical technique acquires a close resemblance to that of R. M. Chisholm. These are, admittedly, only two essays, but I venture to predict that Malcolm has now entered a new phase of his career, and one from which we may expect greater accomplishments. (shrink)